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Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support?
Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their
political power will increase inequality. We shed new light on heterogeneity in economic
elites’ political preferences, arguing that economic elites from an industry can share
distinctive preferences due in part to sharing distinctive predispositions. Consequently, how
increases in economic elites’ influence affect inequality depends on which industry’s elites
are gaining influence and which policy issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with
four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic elites
to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—whose influence is burgeoning—and another of
campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive,
social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences
rare among other economic elites. These differences appear to arise partly from their
distinctive predispositions.
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Concern over the political influence that American economic elites wield is one of the most
significant and enduring foci of political science (e.g., Dahl 1961). Yet, we know remarkably
little about what American economic elites actually want from government. Existing work often
implicitly treats economic elites as homogenous, assuming that they largely support policies that
would increase their wealth and exacerbate many forms of inequality (e.g., Bartels 2008; Hacker
and Pierson 2017).1 This view suggests a “vicious cycle” wherein economic inequality increases
economic elites’ political power, which in turn allows economic elites to advance policies that
exacerbate economic inequality further still.
In this paper, we draw on the literature on mass political behavior and two of the largest surveys
of American economic elites to date to advance a theoretical argument that sheds new light on
heterogeneity in American economic elites’ political preferences. Our argument, elaborated below,
is that economic elites from an industry can share distinctive political preferences due in part to
sharing distinctive political predispositions. We expect that, like the mass public, economic elites’
political views are animated in part by values and predispositions that endure through adulthood
(e.g., Berinsky 2017; Tesler 2015). Moreover, we expect that particular industries may attract
individuals with distinctive predispositions, leading those in that industry to share a distinctive
set of political views. The substantive implication of our argument is that we should not expect
a simple, positive relationship between increases in the economic elites’ political influence and
the enactment of policies that exacerbate inequality. Rather, we should expect the impact of any
growth in economic elites’ influence on inequality to depend on which industry’s rich are gaining
influence and to vary by which policy area is at stake.
To test our argument and demonstrate its implications, we focus on technology entrepreneurs,
a case study of major substantive significance. Technology entrepreneurs are well-positioned to
exert large and growing political influence in American politics for four reasons.
1Due to space constraints, we discuss related studies and data collection efforts in Online Appendix D. We also
review related literature that has debated whether relatively affluent Americans are better represented or are more
consistently conservative than others (e.g., Gilens and Page 2014; Enns 2015).
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First, they command growing personal wealth. Going forward, experts forecast that the
technology industry will produce as many new millionaires as the financial industry.2 They also
comprise a burgeoning share of the ultra-wealthy: as Figure 1a shows, the share of the top 400
wealthiest Americans each year who made their money primarily in the technology sector has
tripled over the last several decades.3 Likewise, six of the ten wealthiest Americans made their
money in technology.4 The American system of campaign finance makes this concentration of
wealth especially consequential. For example, recent federal candidates have referred to Silicon
Valley as a “political ATM”; the number of fundraisers sitting Presidents host in Northern
California, home to Silicon Valley, is now greater than in more-populous Southern California.5
Second, technology entrepreneurs direct companies with enormous structural power over
governments by virtue of their ability to direct investment and jobs (Lindblom 1977). These
resources are significant. As of this writing (Q2 2018), the top five public corporations in the U.S.
by market capitalization are technology companies: Apple, Amazon, Alphabet/Google,
Microsoft, and Facebook. The average market capitalization of these five firms is more than twice
as large as firms in other sectors that have been important to public policymaking such as
financial services (JP Morgan Chase) and fossil fuels (ExxonMobil). Technology entrepreneurs
have deployed their dominant economic positions to influence politics: for example, technology
companies pressured the state of North Carolina to repeal a law that did not allow transgender
people to use the bathroom that matches their gender identity.6
Third, the ubiquitous presence of technology products in Americans’ lives gives technology
2“World Wealth Report,” Capgemini, https://www.worldwealthreport.com/uswr/download.
3We thank Adam Bonica for sharing the Forbes 400 data, which is described in Bonica and Rosenthal (2015). The
list of Forbes 400 individuals coded as technology entrepreneurs and their source of wealth is in Online Appendix I.
4These are Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Ellison, Larry Page, and Sergey Brin.
5See, e.g., “California’s ‘political ATM’ is now located closer to San Francisco than L.A.,” The Switch,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/10/californias-polit
ical-atm-is-now-located-closer-to-san-francisco-than-l-a/.
6“Facebook, Apple, Google, and other tech CEOs demand North Carolina repeal anti-LGBT law”
TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/29/facebook-apple-google-other-tech-c
eos-demand-north-carolina-repeal-anti-lgbt-law/.
2
entrepreneurs an unprecedented platform to influence and mobilize the public. The average
American spends about a third of their waking hours using a computer or smartphone.7 This
access to the public can be extraordinarily consequential. For example, in 2012, Google,
Wikipedia, and other Internet companies asked visitors to their websites to contact Congress to
oppose a pending bill, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), that would have made them liable for
hosting copyright-infringing content. Congress received a deluge of opposition, leading
Congressional support for the legislation to evaporate.8
Fourth, millions of Americans work for companies technology entrepreneurs founded and run,
and these numbers continue to swell: over half of US job growth from 2013 to 2015 was from firms
in just four digital service areas.9 Employers can powerfully influence their employees’ political
behavior, and this leverage gives executives sway with officeholders (Hertel-Fernandez 2018).
Technology entrepreneurs appear especially well-positioned to use these resources to
influence Democratic officeholders in particular. First, technology entrepreneurs are largely loyal
to the Democratic party. For example, campaign contributions to Democrats from technology
industry employees and ultra-wealthy technology entrepreneurs alike have long exceeded
contributions to Republicans. Figures 1b and 1c show trends in the share of contributions flowing
to Democrats from, respectively, all individuals who work for technology companies and among
just elite technology entrepreneurs who have ever been among the 400 wealthiest Americans in a
given year. Figures 1d and 1e show that the total amounts these populations have given to
Democrats have also skyrocketed.10
As we show below, technology entrepreneurs also agree with typical Democratic party
7“AdReaction: Marketing in a multiscreen world,” MillwardBrown, https://www.millwardbrown.com/
adreaction/2014/report/Millward-Brown_AdReaction-2014_Global.pdf.
8“SOPA protests shut down Web sites,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit
ics/2012/01/17/gIQA4WYl6P_story.html.
9“America’s advanced industries: New trends,” Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/research/a
mericas-advanced-industries-new-trends/.
10This is not an artifact of technology entrepreneurs giving to local candidates in Democratic-leaning states, as
patterns are similar at the presidential level.
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Figure 1: Technology entrepreneurs’ wealth is growing, and they increasingly contribute it to Democrats.
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positions on most issues. But, crucially, this may not be the case for all issues. In the case of any
such disagreements, theories of political development predict that as a powerful group aligned
with a party sees its capacity to influence politics grow, it can steer that party’s ideologies and
platforms toward its policy views and priorities (e.g., Bawn et al. 2012; Schickler 2016).11 Figure
2 shows evidence from our survey of Democratic donors, described later, finds that elite
Democratic donors expect exactly this to occur: technology entrepreneurs are one of the groups
Democratic donors most expect to exert more influence with Democratic officeholders in the
future, with a majority expecting their influence to grow. Almost no Democratic donors think
technology entrepreneurs’ influence will decline.
Figure 2: Democratic donors’ forecasts of groups that will gain and lose influence in the party.
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How will technology entrepreneurs use their growing capacity to influence politics, and
especially Democratic politicians? Our theoretical argument generates new insights about the
likely influence technology entrepreneurs will have on the Democratic party and therefore in
American politics more generally. In particular, our argument predicts that it should matter that so
11Even if a group is relatively small or powerless to influence general elections, their influence over party
nominations is thought to allow them to constrain elected officeholders and nominate those who support their group’s
priorities. Consistent with these qualitative findings, survey evidence shows that politicians almost always side
their with copartisans, but that when rich and poor co-partisans disagree, politicians reliably side with their wealthy
copartisans (Lax, Phillips and Zelizer 2017).
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many new economic elites come from this industry, as they may share a set of views that are
distinct from existing American economic elites who hold sway with Democratic officeholders
but who made their money in other industries, such as finance or law.
To test our theoretical argument and better understand this substantively important group, we
conducted four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic
elites to date. Whereas existing evidence in the literature on how economic elites shape political
parties relies to a great extent on historical case studies, our surveys allow us to focus on a
contemporary and developing case where we can collect quantitative data that opens the black
box of an economic elite’s political thinking. First, we surveyed nearly 700 elite technology
entrepreneurs. The companies our survey respondents founded and led have raised more than
$19.6 billion in investment; most are millionaires (i.e., have a net worth over $1 million).12
Second, we surveyed over 1,100 partisan donors. The respondents to this survey collectively
contributed over $17.2 million to campaigns since 2008, and most were also millionaires. Finally,
following most existing research on wealthy Americans’ political views, we also examine
self-identified wealthy respondents to an original survey of the general public. Comparing these
groups of wealthy individuals to technology entrepreneurs allows us to test our argument about
differences between the wealthy in general and economic elites in particular industries.
Later we also present an original survey of undergraduate students from Stanford University,
which graduates more technology company founders than any other US university.13 This survey
joins other evidence we present consistent with technology entrepreneurs sharing distinctive
predispositions, as students majoring in computer science who are likely to join the technology
12We explicitly defined “millionaire” for respondents as having a net worth over $1 million, although it is possible
some respondents misunderstood the question as referring to annual income. Any such respondent misunderstanding
would lead us to understate how elite our samples are, as there are even fewer Americans that have annual incomes
over $1 million than a net worth this high. Nevertheless, although having $1 million in net assets does not necessarily
make one extremely wealthy, this does put one in the top 4% of adults and therefore represents a reasonable threshold
to assess the face validity of the sample.
13“These schools graduate the most funded startup CEOs”, TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2018/
05/12/these-schools-graduate-the-most-funded-startup-ceos/.
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industry in the future already exhibit many of the same views as technology company
founders—even though their peers majoring in biology do not.
These data produced two surprising and substantively significant findings that are consistent
with our theoretical argument that economic elites from an industry can share a distinctive set of
political preferences due in part to sharing a distinctive set of political predispositions.
First, although technology entrepreneurs overwhelmingly support Democrats, most of these
economic elites elites share a particular and unique set of views across policy domains, being
conservative in some important areas. In particular, on issues related to economic redistribution,
globalization, and social issues, technology entrepreneurs are typically as or more liberal than
Democratic citizens, Democratic wealthy individuals, and Democratic donors; they are also more
liberal on all these issues than millionaires in the mass public. However, despite their liberalism
on economic redistribution, technology entrepreneurs are very conservative on issues of
government regulation. Indeed, technology entrepreneurs’ views on regulation closely resemble
those of Republican donors. Technology entrepreneurs are also more conservative than
millionaires in the mass public on issues of regulation, despite being more liberal than
millionaires in other domains. This pattern is surprising in light of popular accounts that describe
technology entrepreneurs as falling within categories familiar in American politics: as typically
liberal, typically conservative, or typically libertarian. None of these traditional categories
captures their views; we show that technology entrepreneurs hold a distinctive set of views
uncommon among any other mass or elite group we examined.
Our second set of findings concerns evidence consistent with our theoretical argument for why
economic elites such as technology entrepreneurs hold the views that they do. Consistent with our
theoretical argument, we show that technology entrepreneurs share a distinct pattern of values and
predispositions that correspond with their views in related policy domains. Most importantly,
with a series of pre-registered comparisons and survey experiments, we show that technology
entrepreneurs’ opposition to government regulation can be traced at least partly to positive
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predispositions towards markets and entrepreneurship—predispositions we also show are already
evident in a sample of undergraduate computer science majors who have demonstrated interest in
joining the industry in the future. We also show that demographics, geography, and economic
interests cannot completely explain these differences. This is not to say that the economic
interests of the technology industry are not important for understanding its anti-regulation
attitudes, but that values and predispositions are also important explanatory factors above and
beyond narrow financial concerns.
Our findings make two main contributions. Theoretically, we illuminate important
heterogeneity in economic elites’ political views. Although we are not the first to suggest that
economic elites are not homogeneous in their political preferences, surprisingly little prior work
has actually theorized or documented the origins or nature of their heterogeneity. Our argument
about political predispositions provides new ways to understand this heterogeneity. This has
important implications for understanding how rising economic inequality impacts politics: we
offer new predictions for how it matters which industries’ economic elites are gaining influence,
as well which policy domains are at stake.
Substantively, our findings also provide new insights into the future of American politics. On
the one hand, as technology entrepreneurs gain wealth and influence, they may potentially serve
as an unexpected source of support for liberal policies in many domains by becoming a key source
of financial support for the Democratic Party. On the other hand, as they gain influence within
the Democratic Party—as Democratic donors expect them to—their conservative views on issues
surrounding labor unions and labor market regulation appear likely to lead the Democratic Party
in new directions, with mixed implications for inequality. We return to this in the discussion.
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The Political Behavior of American Economic Elites
Theoretical Argument
We draw on the literature on mass political behavior to argue that economic elites from an
industry can share distinctive political preferences due in part to sharing a distinctive set of
political predispositions. Our argument begins with the expectation that economic elites should be
similar to the mass public in that their political views stem in part from a broad suite of values and
predispositions that endure through adulthood (e.g., Berinsky 2017; Gerber et al. 2010; Sears and
Funk 1999; Tesler 2015).14
We further expect that those who choose to work in particular industries may tend to share a
common set of these predispositions. This is because predispositions that affect people’s political
views are also thought to guide their choices in non-political domains (e.g., Feldman and Stenner
1997). For example, individuals low in authoritarianism place higher value on curiosity; we would
therefore expect them to be more attracted to careers in industries such as technology and academia
and to succeed in these industries. Their common experiences working in an industry may also
affect their shared predispositions.
We finally expect that any predispositions economic elites in an industry share should also
lead them to share certain political views. Moreover, depending on the particular set of
predispositions, the overall amalgam of policy views the wealthy in an industry exhibit may not
cleanly map to traditional political categories or a single position on a left-right continuum.
Political behavior research on the mass public not only suggests that people’s predispositions
inform their policy preferences; each predisposition is thought to inform people’s policy
preferences in specific domains (Tesler 2015). For example, authoritarianism especially informs
14These predispositions could influence even rational individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors in the presence
of strong self-interest when individuals gain expressive benefits from acting in accordance with their predispositions
about what is proper and the probability that their choices affect outcomes is sufficiently low (Feddersen, Gailmard
and Sandroni 2009).
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attitudes on social issues (Stenner 2005). As a result, an industry that selects for individuals low
in authoritarianism but with other predispositions that incline them towards conservative views
may have a particular mix of liberal views on social issues and conservative views on other issues.
The substantive implication of our argument is that we should not expect a simple, positive
relationship between increases in economic elite’s political influence and the enactment of policies
that exacerbate inequality. Rather, we should expect the impact of any growth in the economic
elite’s influence on inequality to depend on which industry’s rich are getting more influential and
to vary by which policy area is at stake.
Applying Our Argument to Technology Entrepreneurs
Applying our argument to technology entrepreneurs, we hypothesized in a pre-analysis plan15 that
technology entrepreneurs would share a distinctive set of values and predispositions that would
correspond with a distinctive set of political views. We consider views in four main policy
domains: redistribution, regulation, globalization, and social issues. To form our specific
empirical hypotheses regarding technology entrepreneurs’ views in these domains, we examined
the political behavior literature to identify predispositions that: (1) strongly correlated with these
policy attitudes; and (2) based on our qualitative analysis were prevalent among technology elites.
We then selected survey items used by previous research to measure the predispositions, choosing
those that have been found to have high construct validity and reliability.
We first hypothesized that technology entrepreneurs would be low in authoritarianism, a
predisposition that should incline them to be liberal on social issues. Historians have noted that
the contemporary American technology industry emerged out of countercultural movements in
the 1950s and 1960s and continues to attract individuals comfortable with questioning established
social hierarchies and arrangements given the disruptive power of many technologies (Markoff
15We pre-registered our predictions and how we would test them in a pre-analysis plan, described in Online
Appendix J, before collecting the confirmatory dataset described below that we use to test our hypotheses. The
undergraduate survey was inspired by reviewer comments and therefore not part of the pre-analysis plan.
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2005). Authoritarianism involves punitiveness towards those who differ from established norms
and as a result has been found to robustly predict conservative attitudes on social issues such as
abortion and gay rights (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005).
Second, we expected technology entrepreneurs to be highly cosmopolitan, following the work
of Jackman and Vavreck (2011), who define cosmopolitans as people who embrace “things and
people who are different,” and “whose conception of community is much more broad” (i.e.,
global) (p. 72). We expected those who self-select into and lead the technology industry, which is
highly racially diverse and globally integrated, to share this predisposition. Following Jackman
and Vavreck (2011), we therefore predicted that technology entrepreneurs would place
comparatively high weight on the welfare of non-Americans across the globe. For example, we
expected them to support concentrating on problems faced by those abroad and not just problems
here at home, to support free trade, and to allow much greater immigration.16 Technology elites
may, of course, also have economic rationales for supporting increased trade and high-skilled
immigration.
Third, we expected technology entrepreneurs to be low in racial resentment given the
relatively high racial diversity of the educational settings where technology entrepreneurs receive
their training and the geographic areas where they typically live. Those high in racial resentment
should be less likely to select into these experiences or to have this predisposition changed over
time as a result of contact with outgroups. Research indicates that Americans’ attitudes towards
taxing and spending are highly influenced by their views towards the racial minorities they see as
beneficiaries of much of that spending (e.g., Gilens 1999; Tesler 2012). We therefore expected
technology entrepreneurs to be relatively friendly towards taxation and redistribution—in favor of
reducing economic inequality.17
16See also “Ordering vindaloo or hunting for vension,” The Upshot, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
02/28/upshot/ordering-vindaloo-or-hunting-for-venison-how-you-vote.html.
17Although this might go against their personal economic interests in the form of higher taxation, it is also possible
that a stronger safety net may strengthen overall societal human capital and therefore benefit the industry.
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With this said, we did not expect that technology entrepreneurs would simply look like liberal
Democrats in every single domain. We also predicted that technology entrepreneurs would be more
hostile than other Democrats towards government regulation. Their industry’s interests certainly
favor these views in many cases, but we also expected individuals who select into entrepreneurship
to have positive predispositions towards markets and entrepreneurs, which would make them wary
of government constraining markets and entrepreneurs in these areas. Later, we present survey
experiments and other theoretically informative comparisons that suggest that these predispositions
play an important role in informing technology entrepreneurs’ views on regulation.
Data: Original Surveys
We tested our hypotheses with surveys of technology entrepreneurs, partisan donors, and the mass
public we conducted during the last week of February 2017. Nearly all respondents to all three
surveys completed their responses during that week. This means we can rule out that any
differences between the groups are due to reactions to different contemporaneous political events.
The undergraduate survey we discuss later was conducted in March 2018.
Survey of Technology Entrepreneurs
We exploit the existence of a unique sampling frame to study technology entrepreneurs:
Crunchbase, a professionally run, comprehensive database of individuals in the technology
industry. We gathered a random sample of 8,499 individuals listed as founders or CEOs of
companies in Crunchbase in 2013. We conducted several small, exploratory surveys of random
subsamples of these individuals to formulate our hypotheses and register them in a pre-analysis
plan. We next attempted to survey an independent group of 4,245 individuals in this frame to test
our hypotheses. This survey received 691 responses, a response rate of 16%.18 We only analyze
data from US citizens and residents, which excludes 88 respondents.
18For further discussion of survey response rates, see Online Appendix E.1.
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Our survey appears to have successfully captured elite technology entrepreneurs. Data from
the sampling frame indicates that the company founded or led by the median respondent raised
well over $1,000,000 in venture capital funding, with many having raised substantially more (see
Online Appendix E.2.1). Figure 3 shows that the modal US respondent indicated they were a
millionaire who founded and runs a company in the technology industry with approximately 100
employees.
Figure 3: Self-reported respondent characteristics: technology entrepreneur survey.
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Survey of Partisan Donors
To compare the pressures technology entrepreneurs will place on politicians with the pressures
politicians are currently experiencing from economic elites in their party (Lax, Phillips and Zelizer
13
2017), we also conducted an original survey of partisan donors with a substantial oversample of the
top 1% of donors.19 1,152 of the 16,400 donors we sampled completed the survey, a response rate
of about 7%, which is slightly higher than similar surveys of the mass public recruited to online
surveys by mail and comparable to telephone surveys of the mass public.20
We appear to have successfully captured elite donors with this survey. In total, the respondents
to this survey have donated over $17.6 million to the political parties since 2008. A majority
identified as millionaires.
Wealthy Individuals and Partisans in the Mass Public
As a further comparison, we gathered 1,636 survey responses from the mass public from Survey
Sampling International. This large sample size means that we have reasonably sized subsamples
of Americans who identify as Democrats, as Republicans, and as millionaires (4.4% of the sample
identified as such). We quota-sampled to achieve benchmarks on education, gender, race, and party
identification.
Representativeness
Due to space constraints, we present data on the representativeness of these three samples in Online
Appendix E.2. We find that these samples are generally closely representative of their sampling
frames on many characteristics. The two exceptions are that the technology entrepreneur sample
underrepresents companies that shut down (likely because they no longer were reachable at the
same e-mail addresses) and that very large donors were less likely to respond to the donor survey.
Thankfully, we oversampled very large donors in anticipation and so still have responses from
many of them. Online Appendix Section C.3 also shows versions of our main analyses that weight
all respondents by all the characteristics we describe in Appendix E.2; the results do not change.
19Online Appendix E.3 discusses how we defined this sampling frame and our mail-to-online survey procedure.
20See Online Appendix E.1.
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Descriptive Results
Technology Entrepreneurs’ Support for Democratic Candidates and Many
Liberal Policies
To motivate our main analyses, we first show that most technology entrepreneurs support
Democratic candidates and liberal policies in most policy domains.
First, the partisan orientations of the technology entrepreneurs in our sample are clear: the
technology entrepreneurs who responded to our survey lean heavily Democratic. 75.2% indicated
that they supported Hillary Clinton in the 2016 Presidential election, versus only 8.8% who
supported Donald Trump. 61.3% of technology entrepreneurs in our survey identify as Democrats
versus only 14.1% who identify as Republicans. As mentioned above, these findings are not
artifacts of our sample or cheap talk on surveys, as similar patterns emerge in campaign
donations.
Next, to characterize their views on issues, we show results for indices we formed by combining
related survey items in each of four policy areas. We combine the items by rescaling each to 0-1
and then taking the average of these items, such that the most liberal possible pattern of responses
across all items within a domain would yield a 1 and the most conservative a 0. We exclude missing
and don’t-know responses.21
As we expected, technology entrepreneurs have liberal views in many policy domains. Figure 4
illustrates the results, showing averages of each scale along with 95% confidence intervals among
(a) the entire public, (b) just those in the public who identify as Democrats,22 (c) just those people
21Our pre-analysis plan, given in Online Appendix J, specified which survey items we would combine into each
index and gives the item wordings. Table 1 gives a summary of the items we use to form each of the four scales.
Online Appendix B gives the marginal distribution on every item by group, organized by policy area, and shows that
the results are similar for the individual items. Because the differences we discuss are usually large, much of the paper
focuses on visual presentation of the results. Throughout the paper we will also report two-tailed p-values on the
numerical differences we discuss. Online Appendix C also presents regression models that formally test the relevant
hypotheses about differences between the groups we discuss, as laid out in our pre-analysis plan.
22We ask the standard ANES party identification question and include leaners as partisans.
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Table 1: Summary of Survey Items in Each Policy Scale
Social Issues Globalism
• Same-sex marriage. • Pay less attention to problems overseas
and concentrate on problems at home.
• View on abortion (scale with options). • In trade agreements, prioritize
American jobs over foreign jobs.
• Gun control. • Ideal immigration policy (scale with
defined options).
• Death penalty. • Free trade agreements are a good thing.
Redistribution Regulation
• Support for universal healthcare, even if
means raising taxes.
• Regulate Uber like taxis.
• Support programs benefiting only poorest
Americans.
• Regulate ‘gig’ workers like regular
workers.
• Support taxes on those making >$250k
per year.
• It is too hard to fire workers.
• Support taxes on those making >$1MM
per year.
• Government regulation of business does
more harm than good.
• Increase federal spending on the poor. • Regulations on drones, self-driving
cars, and internet companies (separate
items).*
*Later we show that our results are similar on views on the regulation of three non-technology industries.
in the public who identify as Democrats and have college degrees,23 (d) just Democratic donors,
(e) just those in the public that identify as Republicans, (f) just Republican donors, and, finally, (g)
technology entrepreneurs. Online Appendix F shows a comparison with millionaires in the mass
public.
First, technology entrepreneurs are the most pro-globalism of any of the groups save for
Democratic donors (0.14 to 0.36 scale points greater than the other groups, p < 0.01 for all
comparisons). For example, they are the most likely to say that trade policy should prioritize the
well-being of those abroad instead of Americans (with 44% agreeing), to disagree that we should
pay less attention to problems overseas (with 53% disagreeing), and to support free trade
23We conduct this comparison to show that technology entrepreneurs’ set of views does not simply reflect the fact
that they are educated Democrats; they are distinct from other educated Democrats.
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agreements (87%). 56% favor increasing levels of immigration, essentially equal to Democratic
donors and more than any other sample, including 15 points higher than Democratic citizens
(p < 0.01). All these policy views militate in favor of greater global equality.
Figure 4: Average of Policy Indices by Area
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On social issues, technology entrepreneurs are again very liberal—as liberal as Democratic
donors and more so than Democratic citizens (0.19 scale points greater, p < 0.01). They nearly
universally support same-sex marriage (96%), favor gun control (82%), oppose the death penalty
(67%), and view abortion as a matter of personal choice (79%).
Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, technology entrepreneurs strongly support
redistribution and taxation. They appear similar to Democratic citizens and donors on these items
and more liberal than independent citizens, Republican citizens, and Republican donors (p < 0.01
for all three comparisons). For example, nearly all technology entrepreneurs support increasing
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taxes on those making over $250,000 or $1,000,000 per year (with 76% and 83% expressing some
support for each, respectively, and a majority expressing “strong” support for both). 75% support
federal spending on programs that benefit only the poor and 59% think such spending should be
increased. 82% indicate support for universal healthcare even if it means raising taxes, with a
majority again offering “strong” support for this proposition. Only small minorities of technology
entrepreneurs want federal spending on the poor to decrease (6%), and only 6% of technology
entrepreneurs strongly disagree that the government should ensure universal healthcare coverage,
the category into which a majority of Republican donors fall. These patterns are also evident
when comparing technology entrepreneurs and millionaires in the mass public; technology
entrepreneurs are more liberal than millionaires in the mass public in all three of these domains.24
Technology entrepreneurs’ strong support for taxing the wealthy and for redistribution may
be surprising in light of accounts that depict them as libertarians (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2017,
p. 189). Table 2, however, shows that, relative to the other samples, technology entrepreneurs
are actually unusually unlikely to agree with a description of libertarian philosophy.25 Although
technology entrepreneurs share certain views associated with libertarianism, their liberal views on
economic redistribution belie this characterization.
Other data we collected suggests that these liberal attitudes matter to technology entrepreneurs.
When we asked technology entrepreneurs on one of our preliminary surveys to pick three policy
areas that were most important to them, they were even more likely than the general public to select
areas related to public goods provision, such as education, the environment, public infrastructure,
and health care. They were, if anything, less likely to list taxes as representing an important
problem (see Online Appendix G).
24See Online Appendix F. Online Appendix C.3 also presents weighted versions of these analyses; the results are
essentially identical.
25In pilot surveys, we likewise found that very few technology entrepreneurs explicitly self-identify as libertarians.
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Table 2: Technology Entrepreneurs Do Not Agree with Libertarian Philosophy
Technology Democratic Republican Democrats Republicans
Entrepreneur Donor Donor (Public (Public
Survey Survey Survey Survey) Survey)
Agree With
Libertarian
Philosophy
23.5% 5.1% 68.4% 43.8% 62.5%
Notes: Data from our technology entrepreneur, and mass public surveys. The surveys asked
whether individuals agreed or disagreed with the statement “I would like to live in a society where
government does nothing except provide national defense and police protection, so that people
could be left alone to earn whatever they could.” This question wording is from Page, Bartels
and Seawright (2013). Cell probabilities above give the percent that either somewhat or strongly
agreed.
Technology Entrepreneurs Typically Oppose Regulation Despite Their Other
Liberal Views
The results we have presented so far could be easily explained by the theory that technology
entrepreneurs are Democrats and so tend to have liberal views on policy issues generally.
However, as a reminder, our theoretical argument predicted that economic elites in a particular
industry—due in part to their shared predispositions—may share a set of political views that is
highly distinctive. Our first main result is that technology entrepreneurs are in fact distinctive,
being very conservative within the specific issue domain of regulation—particularly of labor
markets.
Technology entrepreneurs’ conservative views on regulation can be seen in the bottom right
panel of Figure 4. Despite having views similar to wealthy Democrats in most policy domains,
including economic redistribution, technology entrepreneurs do not share conventional Democratic
views on the regulation of product and labor markets. Technology entrepreneurs are indeed more
conservative even than Republican citizens (by 0.15 scale points, p < 0.01) and most similar to
Republican donors (who are only 0.05 scale points higher). For example, technology entrepreneurs
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almost all believe, much like Republican donors and citizens, that it is too difficult to fire workers
and that the government should make it easier to do so (82%). However, majorities of Democratic
donors and citizens believe the government should make it harder to fire workers (a 50 percentage
point difference from technology entrepreneurs, p < 0.01). Consistent with this difference, 74%
of technology entrepreneurs say they would like to see labor unions’ influence decrease, versus
only 18% of Democratic donors and 33% of Democratic citizens (p < 0.01 in both cases).
Technology entrepreneurs are also less likely than Democrats to support regulation in product
markets, and much more likely to believe that government regulation of business does more harm
than good (for individual items, see Figure OA7; differences between 17 and 19 percentage points
relative to Democratic donors; p < 0.01 for all comparisons). For example, technology
entrepreneurs, like Republicans, believe the government should not strictly regulate Uber like
taxis (70%). Democratic citizens and donors, however, do not agree (30-32 percentage point
differences, p < 0.01).
Technology entrepreneurs are also more conservative than even millionaires in the mass public
on matters of regulation, even though they are more liberal than millionaires in the mass public in
other domains. These findings hold even when we compare millionaire technology entrepreneurs
to millionaires in the mass public.26
Technology entrepreneurs’ mix of conservative views on regulation and liberal views on
economic redistribution is unique. Figure 5 shows that there is a nearly perfect correlation
between how economically conservative each sample is on matters of regulation and how
economically conservative it is on matters of redistribution—except for technology entrepreneurs.
This pattern is consistent with our broader theoretical argument that economic elites in an
industry may share a highly distinctive set of policy views; no other samples evince technology
entrepreneurs’ mix of liberal redistributive but conservative regulatory views.
To confirm that technology entrepreneurs indeed tend to support redistribution yet oppose
26See Online Appendix F.
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Figure 5: Technology Entrepreneurs’ Distinctive Set of Economic Views
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Notes: Each point shows the mean of each sample’s scores on the redistribution and regulation
scales on the x and y axes, respectively. The blue line shows the line of best fit for samples other
than the technology sample.
regulation more than other Democrats, we also asked our samples to indicate which of four
statements came closest to their views, with response options such as “The government should
tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs,” “The government
should not tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs,” and so
on. Table 3 shows the results. Technology entrepreneurs are the only group to predominantly
select the option “The government should not tightly regulate business, and should tax the
wealthy to fund social programs,” with a majority selecting this option—nearly twice as many as
any other group, including millionaires in the mass public and the current donor base of both
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parties.
Table 3: Technology Entrepreneurs Uniquely Support Redistribution but Oppose Regulation
Technology Democratic Republican Democrats Republicans Millionaires
Entrepreneurs Donors Donors (Public) (Public) (Public)
Do Regulate and
Do Redistribute 17.9% 62.6% 2.8% 53.8% 28.8% 31.8%
Don’t Regulate and
Do Redistribute 60.1% 34.7% 20.9% 36.3% 34.5% 30.3%
Do Regulate and
Don’t Redistribute 2.8% 1.2% 1.6% 6.0% 9.3% 9.1%
Don’t Regulate and
Don’t Redistribute 19.3% 1.5% 74.7% 3.9% 27.4% 28.8%
In summary, we have shown that a majority of technology entrepreneurs have a pattern of
views that is rare among other groups of wealthy individuals or in the public: a mix of liberal
views on issues related to social, global, and economic redistribution, but conservative views in the
economic domain on matters of regulation.
Results Consistent with Theoretical Mechanisms
In this section we present data that is consistent with the theoretical mechanisms we posited forwhy
economic elites who made their money in a particular industry such as technology would share a
particular pattern of views: the particular set of predispositions that those in an industry would tend
to share as a result of who selects into each industry, who succeeds in it, and the experiences they
have working in it. In the case of technology entrepreneurs, as described previously, we anticipated
that their views on social issues would arise in part from low authoritarianism, that their globalist
views would arise in part from their high cosmopolitanism, that their support for redistribution
would arise in part from their low racial resentment, and that their hostility to regulation would
arise in part from their positive attitudes towards markets and entrepreneurs. This helps address
the puzzle of why technology entrepreneurs have conservative views on regulation despite their
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liberal views on other issues—including other economic issues.
To test whether differences in these predispositions help explain the distinctive pattern of policy
views technology entrepreneurs hold, we conduct a wide array of tests. Each of these tests has
complementary strengths and weaknesses; they together help build support for multiple empirical
predictions of our theoretical argument.
Documenting Differences in Predispositions
First, we document differences in measures of the four predispositions we previously specified.
This establishes the plausibility of our argument that differences in predispositions help explain
the particular set of views technology entrepreneurs share. Table 4 summarizes the items we used
to measure each of these predispositions. Online Appendix J contains the full item wordings.
Table 4: Summary of Survey Items in Each Predisposition Scale
Authoritarianism Cosmopolitanism
Source: Feldman and Stenner (1997) Source: Jackman and Vavreck (2011)
child rearing questions. • Consider self citizen of world.
• Obedience or Self-Reliance • Hold a passport.
• Curiosity or Good Manners • Been to Canada or Mexico.
• Being Considerate or Well Behaved • Been to Europe.
• Independence or Respect for Elders • Been to Africa, Asia, or South America.
• Gone to an Indian restaurant.
• Eaten sushi.
Racial Resentment Markets and Entrepreneurs
Source: Kinder and Sanders (1996), Here we summarize this disposition
abbreviated. with a question about the contribution
• If blacks only tried harder, they would be of entrepreneurs to the economy.
better off. See next section for survey experiments
• Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. using additional measures of positive
predispositions towards markets and
entrepreneurs that operate even in
policy domains beyond their self-interest.
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To confirm our premise that there is a relationship between each of the policy areas and the
corresponding predisposition we measured, in Online Appendix Table OA5 we replicate the
bivariate relationships other research has found between these values and predispositions and
these policy areas in our mass public sample (all relationships significant at p < 0.01). For
instance, moving across the range of authoritarianism is associated with a 0.82 standard deviation
change in attitudes on social attitudes.
We next present several tests of our predictions regarding the theoretical mechanisms
underlying technology entrepreneurs’ distinctive pattern of policy views. As a first test, we
predicted that technology entrepreneurs would have very liberal underlying values and
predispositions in the areas we hypothesized would correspond with their liberal views. Figure 6
shows that the results confirm this prediction. Technology entrepreneurs are very low in
authoritarianism, very high on cosmopolitanism, and very low on racial resentment.
Why Do Technology Entrepreneurs Oppose Regulation?
The next body of evidence we present with regard to theoretical mechanisms is focused on
explaining our most surprising result: that technology entrepreneurs are conservative on issues of
government regulation despite their liberalism on other economic and non-economic issues.
Ruling out Demographics and Geography
To triangulate the mechanism responsible, we first test implications of two obvious alternative
explanations for technology entrepreneurs’ opposition to regulation: a simple demographic
explanation and geography. We find no evidence for either.
Due to space constraints, we present these results in Online Appendix C.4 and only briefly
review them here. First, using the mass public sample, we find it is not the case that wealthy or
highly educated individuals or Democrats are generally hostile to regulation; something is
different about technology entrepreneurs. Even millionaires in the mass public are more friendly
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Figure 6: Values and Predispositions
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to regulation than technology entrepreneurs. We also present regressions that control for
education, gender, age, and income and still find the same differences between our samples even
conditional on these traits. Finally, we show that the unique pattern of views held by economic
elites from the technology industry also does not appear attributable to where they tend to live, as
the results are the same when we conduct our comparisons within geographic areas.
Opposition to Regulation of Non-Technology Companies
Another possible explanation for technology entrepreneurs’ opposition to regulation is that they
are answering with the technology industry’s economic interests in mind. Our argument allows
for economic interests to affect technology entrepreneurs’ views, but holds that predispositions
exert their own influence in addition. We conducted three analyses to test whether technology
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entrepreneurs’ hostility to regulation manifests over and above self-interested concerns by
examining their views towards both technology and non-technology products and services.
Uber versus Florists Survey Experiment. We first test whether technology entrepreneurs still
take entrepreneurs’ side of a contentious issue when the same underlying principle is at play but
we vary whether the entrepreneurs are from the technology industry or not. In particular, one
salient example of a growing technology company that has faced the threat of regulation is Uber;
specifically, its practice of “surge pricing,” or raising fares at times of high demand.
Unsurprisingly, when we asked technology entrepreneurs whether they thought Uber’s surge
pricing was fair, 93% said that they did. On the other hand, both Democrats and Republicans in
the mass public were split, with only 43% and 51% respectively finding it fair (differences from
technology entrepreneurs significant at p < 0.01).
A between-subjects survey experiment we conducted suggests that technology entrepreneurs’
support for demand-based pricing reflects their broader principles and not only a defense of a
technology company. Half of each sample did not see a question about Uber’s surge pricing but
instead a question from Shiller, Boycko and Korobov (1990) touching on the same underlying
principle in a different industry: “On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, sellers
usually increase their prices. Do you think it is fair for them to raise their prices like this?” Figure
7 shows that technology entrepreneurs were just as likely to consider this practice fair (96%),
even though it has nothing to do with the technology industry. But a majority of both Democratic
and Republican partisans, 61% and 58% respectively, still considered it unfair (differences with
technology entrepreneurs significant at p < 0.01). This contrast suggests an underlying difference
in how technology entrepreneurs view markets, regardless of whether their own industry is
implicated.
Regulation of business question wording experiment. We conducted a second survey
experiment in a similar spirit that probed individuals’ attitudes about regulation more explicitly.
In our survey, we modified the standard agree-disagree survey question, “Government regulation
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Figure 7: Uber versus Florists Survey Experiment
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of business does more harm than good,” to see whether technology entrepreneurs would be
especially likely to agree if we changed the question to focus on the technology industry
specifically (e.g., “Government regulation of the technology industry does more harm than
good.”).
The results do not support the view that technology entrepreneurs answer questions about
regulation differently than other groups only because they are more likely to be looking out for
the technology industry’s interests. Table 5 shows their agreement increases by 0.3 scale points to
2.7 when the technology industry is the focus on the question. However, other Democrats without
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Table 5: Technology Entrepreneurs More Likely to Oppose Regulation of Technology, Less Likely to Oppose of Other
Industries; But So Are Other Democrats
DV = “Government regulation of [CATEGORY]
does more harm than good.” (1-4 scale)
Technology
Entrepreneurs
Democratic
Donors
Democratic
Partisans
All Three
Groups
Treatments
“the technology industry” 0.28* 0.46*** 0.19* 0.28*
(0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
“the financial industry -0.50*** -0.32*** -0.20* -0.50***
(such as banks)” (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12)
“the pharmaceutical industry” -0.37** -0.08 -0.10 -0.37**
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Sample Dummies (Technology
Entrepreneurs = Base Category)
Democratic Donors -0.94***
(0.10)
Democrats (Mass Public) -0.03
(0.10)
Treatment X Sample Interactions
Technology x Democratic Donors 0.18
(0.14)
Technology x Democrats (Mass Public) -0.09
(0.14)
Finance x Democratic Donors 0.19
(0.14)
Finance x Democrats (Mass Public) 0.30*
(0.14)
Pharmaceuticals x Democratic Donors 0.29*
(0.14)
Pharmaceuticals x Democrats (Mass Public) 0.27
(0.14)
Constant (Base Category = Tech. 2.61*** 1.67*** 2.58*** 2.61***
Entrepreneurs’ Responses (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
When No Industry Is Specified)
Observations 439 846 817 2,102
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.02 0.25
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).
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a stake in regulation of the technology industry react similarly to this manipulation. In fact,
Democratic donors react even more strongly to the “technology industry” treatment than the
technology entrepreneurs, suggesting that there is a more general view among Americans that
regulation of the technology industry is slightly more harmful than regulation of other industries,
and that technology entrepreneurs are not dissimilar in holding this view. As the bolded
coefficients in the final column of Table 5 show, the technology entrepreneurs’ reaction to the
treatment that focused on technology regulation is statistically indistinguishable from that of other
Democrats.
Views toward Regulating Technology Versus Non-Technology Industries. As a final test, we
also investigated whether technology entrepreneurs would remain more opposed to regulation
than Democratic citizens and donors when we asked about non-technology products and services,
and compared how these differences between groups would vary when technology products and
services were the focus.27 Our surveys asked respondents “Do you think government regulation
of business should increase, stay the same, or decrease in the following areas?” We asked about
three technology industries (drones, self-driving cars, Internet data) and three non-technology
industries (finance, health insurance, oil/gas). We stacked the data at the respondent-by-industry
level and then estimated an OLS regression model predicting anti-regulation attitudes (on the
three-point response scale recoded to range from 0 to 1) with a dummy representing technology
elites, a dummy representing whether the industry in question was technology related, and the
interaction between the two.
We find that technology entrepreneurs are more opposed to regulation than Democrats
regardless of the industry in question. The first coefficient in Table 6 for the main effect of
technology elites shows that technology elites are on average 0.083 scale points more opposed to
regulation of non-technology industries than the Democratic samples (p < 0.01). The second
coefficient for the main effect of technology products and services shows that the Democratic
27This analysis was not pre-registered; we conceived it on the basis of a comment from a peer reviewer.
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samples are on average 0.053 more opposed to regulation of technology products and services
than the non-technology products and services (p < 0.01). The final, statistically insignificant and
substantively small coefficient on the interaction term of 0.012 indicates that technology
entrepreneurs are similar to other Democratic samples in their reaction to regulation of
technology versus non-technology companies.
Table 6: Technology Entrepreneurs No More Likely to Oppose Regulating Technology Products than Democratic
Groups
DV = Opposition to regulation of particular
products and services (0-1 scale)
Technology Elites 0.083**
(0.014)
Tech Product/Service 0.053**
(0.006)
Technology Elites x Tech Product/Service 0.012
(0.016)
Constant (Base Category = 0.200**
Democratic Samples) (0.006)
Observations 12,656
R-squared 0.018
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).
Notes: Data is stacked at the respondent-by-product/service level. Only technology elites,
Democratic donors, and Democratic partisans in the public are included in this regression.
To summarize, the three analyses in this subsection consistently find that technology
entrepreneurs are more opposed to regulation than Democrats regardless of whether the
technology industry’s interests are at stake. This consistent pattern suggests that technology
entrepreneurs have a favorable disposition in favor of entrepreneurs and against government
regulation that transcends the interests of the technology industry.
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Other Attitudes Consistent with Hypothesized Predispositions
To further test our theoretical argument that economic elites from an industry may share distinct
political predispositions, we next conduct additional tests of our empirical prediction
that—despite their liberal views on economic redistribution—technology entrepreneurs react
especially positively towards markets and entrepreneurs and more negatively towards government
intervention in the economy.
Privately versus Publicly Administered Services. First, technology entrepreneurs’ greater
friendliness towards market (vs. government-based) solutions extends to their views over how
redistribution should take place. Column 1 of Table 7 reports a regression with the outcome
computed as the difference between support for government-run programs and private-sector run
programs on indicators for each group. The baseline category is technology entrepreneurs,
meaning the constant term shows they are 0.39 scale points more in favor of programs run by the
private sector rather than government. This is essentially identical to Republicans citizens and
significantly different from Democratic donors (p < 0.01) and citizens (p < 0.01), who are more
supportive of having the government run publicly funded programs.
Belief That Government Programs Do a Good Job. We next asked respondents whether they
thought “the government generally does a good job of running social programs meant to help poor
people.” The second column of Table 7 shows that technology entrepreneurs were more likely to
disagree than agree with this question. Democrats were much more likely to agree.
Positive Views of Entrepreneurs. They also have a highly positive view of entrepreneurs, as
first previewed in Figure 6. The third column of Table 7 shows a regression with the outcome of
whether individuals agreed with the statement that “Entrepreneurs and other people with new ideas
get too much credit these days; ordinary people who work hard are the backbone of this country.”
Technology entrepreneurs are similar to Republican donors on this question, and distinct from all
Democratic groups.
Opposition to both private and public sector union influence. We also asked technology
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Table 7: Relative to Democrats, Technology Entrepreneurs Prefer Private- to Public-Sector Management Generally
Approval of Privately
Run Programs (1-5)
Minus Approval of
Gov’t Run Social
Programs (1-5)
Gov’t Does Good
Job Running
Social Programs
(1-4)
Entrepreneurs
Get Too Much
Credit (1-4)
Democratic Donors -1.73*** 0.64*** 0.43***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Democrats (Mass Public) -0.62*** 0.17*** 0.76***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Republican Donors 1.16*** -0.89*** -0.06
(0.13) (0.07) (0.06)
Republicans (Mass Public) -0.05 -0.15** 0.76***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant (Base Category = 0.44*** 2.19*** 2.20***
Technology Entrepreneurs) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 2,952 2,940 3,069
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.13
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).
entrepreneurs whether they would like to see labor unions’ influence decline, but randomly
assigned whether we asked them about public sector or private sector unions. We would expect
technology entrepreneurs to oppose both private and public sector unions because unions
constrain the ability of managers to freely hire and fire workers. Significantly, although
technology entrepreneurs have weaker economic interests in opposing influence from public
sector than private sector unions, they are just as likely to say they would like see private sector
(76%) and public sector (72%) unions influence decline (see Online Appendix Figure OA3).
These questions and experiments support our prediction that technology entrepreneurs hold
genuine values and predispositions related to free markets and government involvement in the
economy that lead them to differ strongly from Democrats on regulation, even when the technology
industry’s interests are not at stake.28 In Online Appendix H, we show that these relationships
and differences with other Democrats hold even when examining technology entrepreneurs who
28As expected, relationships between the three variables we used as outcomes in Table 7 correlate with opposition
to regulation more generally. We report these relationships in Table OA6.
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identify as Democrats. Again, technology entrepreneurs hold these conservative economic values
relevant to regulation despite being very liberal on economic redistribution.
Comparison to Undergraduate Computer Science and Biology Majors
Our theory argues that economic elites from particular industries will tend to share unique sets of
policy attitudes in part due to the pre-existing predispositions that lead individuals to select into
working in each industry in the first place. To test this mechanism, we examine whether college
students who have shown an interest in the technology industry will exhibit many of the
predispositions and policy views that also characterize older wealthy technology entrepreneurs.
Examining college students also allows us to capture attitudes before these individuals have
immediate economic interests, although of course undergraduates may be forward looking.29
To test this prediction of our argument, we surveyed computer science majors at Stanford
University, which graduates the most technology company founders of any US university.30 We
also surveyed biology majors from the same institution as a comparison group to show that the
patterns we find among computer science majors are not present generally among STEM
undergraduates at this institution.31
Figure 8 displays our four policy preference indices among college-educated Democrats,
Democratic donors, technology entrepreneurs, and our two undergraduate samples.32 Computer
science and biology majors at this university are both more liberal than other college-educated
Democrats in the mass public on every issue—with the exception that computer science majors in
particular, to a greater extent than biology majors, are notably less liberal than the public on the
29For other research that surveys undergraduates to understand processes of political socialization, see Lawless and
Fox (2015).
30“These schools graduate the most funded startup CEOs”, TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2018/
05/12/these-schools-graduate-the-most-funded-startup-ceos/.
31Online Appendix Section E.4 describes the survey procedures. Our undergraduate survey instrument was identical
to our other surveys. Undergraduates at this university can declare either major as early in their undergraduate careers
as they like, and there are no requirements (e.g., course prerequisites) for declaring either major.
32Online Appendix Table OA1 presents equivalent regressions.
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issue of regulation. This is the same pattern as we see with adult technology entrepreneurs,
exactly as our theory would predict.
Likewise, Online Appendix Table OA2 shows that computer science majors are similar to
technology entrepreneurs in being especially likely to select the “Don’t Regulate and Do
Redistribute” option on the four-option question about regulation and redistribution we had
previously shown in Table 3. A majority of computer science majors selected this
option—57%—a figure indistinguishable from the technology sample. This is the only other
sample we studied where a majority selected this option. A much smaller share of biology
undergraduates did so—39%—a figure significantly different than the computer science majors
and technology entrepreneurs (p < 0.01 for both comparisons).
Figure 8: Comparing Democrats, Technology Entrepreneurs, and Undergraduates – Policy Views
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Online Appendix E.4.1 presents additional results on specific items. These results are broadly
consistent with computer science undergraduates resembling technology elites more on matters
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of underlying principle and less for issues where economic interests or experience working in the
industry is likely to color individuals’ views. For example, on issues like whether it is fair for
entrepreneurs to raise prices—be they florists or a technology company like Uber—the computer
science majors are indistinguishable from technology entrepreneurs and quite distinct from both
biology majors and other Democratic groups. But, when it comes to labor unions—an issue on
which we would not expect undergraduates to have much direct experience—computer science
majors look like other Democrats.
In summary, our survey of undergraduates provides additional support for our theory that
individuals entering certain industries will share particular predispositions and longstanding
attitudes. Undergraduate computer science majors already exhibit many of the distinctive patterns
of views and predispositions present among technology entrepreneurs—patterns that their peers
majoring in biology did not exhibit.
As with our other evidence, our survey of undergraduates does not definitively rule out all other
alternative explanations.33 However, this evidence joins the other evidence we presented above
that, as a whole, validates many predictions of our theory about the relevance of predispositions to
economic elite’s political views.
Discussion
In a time of rising economic inequality, one of the most theoretically influential and publicly
relevant areas of political science research concerns how economic elites influence politics.
Research establishes that economic elites can potentially exert outsized influence, but we know
surprisingly little about what economic elites want government to do and why. In this paper, we
drew on theories of mass political behavior to argue that economic elites from particular
33For example, it remains possible that computer science majors are internalizing their future self-interest (although
this would not explain why they support taxing the wealthy given that a large share of them, statistically, are likely to
become wealthy). Nor would it explain why they, like the technology entrepreneurs, support the price discrimination
practices of florists.
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industries may share distinctive values and predispositions that lead them to support a distinctive
set of policies. Those in a given industry, we argued, might share a distinctive pattern of
predispositions due to the unique kind of individuals that select into working in each industry,
succeed in it, and the experiences they have within it. The implication of our argument is that we
should not expect a simple, positive relationship between increases in economic elites’ political
influence and the enactment of policies that exacerbate inequality. Instead, we expect the impact
of any growth in economic elite’s influence on politics and inequality to depend on which
industry’s rich are getting more influential and which policy area is at stake.
In the United States, for example, many new millionaires and billionaires made their money in
the technology industry. Our argument holds that it should matter that so many new economic
elites are from this industry because a particular kind of individual may be attracted to becoming
a technology entrepreneur. To demonstrate this argument, we conducted the two largest surveys
of American economic elites to date. These unique surveys allowed us to test key predictions of
our broader argument. Our findings were by no means obvious. We showed that technology
entrepreneurs are different than economic elites in general. Moreover, they are not simply
libertarians (economic conservatives and social liberals), nor simply liberals or conservatives.
Indeed, very few of them fit any of these traditional categories. Rather, they share a unique set of
predispositions that correspond with liberal policy preferences in many domains, including
taxation and government spending—but not on government regulation. Using our other surveys to
provide points of comparison, we established that this pattern of views is unique to technology
entrepreneurs, not being seen in other groups of wealthy individuals, including among the
Democratic Party’s current donor base or among millionaires in the mass public. Technology
entrepreneurs were more conservative than these groups in the regulatory domain despite being
more liberal than them in other domains. Additional evidence consistent with our argument also
helped illuminate why technology entrepreneurs have distinctive views in the domain of
regulation. We showed that beyond industry incentives, their positive predispositions towards
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markets and entrepreneurs appear to be why their views differ from other Democrats, differences
that emerged even when comparing Democratic citizens and donors to the technology
entrepreneurs who explicitly identify as Democrats. Finally, in a comparison with undergraduate
biology and computer science majors, we found that many of these differences between
technology entrepreneurs and other educated individuals in scientific fields appear to manifest
even before they enter the workforce—consistent with longstanding predispositions playing a
role.
On a substantive level, the differences we found between technology entrepreneurs and other
Democratic groups portend changes within the Democratic Party with mixed implications for
inequality. On the one hand, technology entrepreneurs seem poised to support Democratic
candidates—and therefore redistributive policies that should reduce inequality—financially;
campaign contributions by the Forbes 400 have trended Democratic in recent years largely
because of the growing presence of wealthy technology entrepreneurs in this elite group (Bonica
and Rosenthal 2015). But this will also likely secure technology entrepreneurs influence with
Democratic officeholders. Indeed, Figure 2 showed that Democratic donors expect that
technology entrepreneurs are likely to gain influence within the Democratic Party in the coming
years, coupled with a declining influence of organized labor. And despite their liberal views in
many domains, these technology entrepreneurs generally stand opposed to many government
interventions in markets—such as government support for labor unions, worker protections, and
consumer protections—that have long been central to the Democratic Party’s ideological answer
to inequality and supported by traditional Democratic constituencies such as unions. As
Democratic elected officials receive increasing financial support from technology entrepreneurs
and attempt to court further support from them still, struggles over the position of the Democratic
Party on regulating product and labor markets thus may take center stage.
Changes in the American economy are also affecting the balance of economic power across
other industries. What do our theory and data indicate about economic elites in these industries?
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No representative surveys of economic elites exist as far as we know, and the little data on
economic elites that does exist is too limited at present to test further implications of our theory
for other industries. We were able to show that technology entrepreneurs are different than other
economic elites generally, such as millionaires in the mass public and wealthy partisan donors.
For example, Online Appendix F showed that technology entrepreneurs are more opposed to
regulation than other millionaires but also more liberal on other issues than other millionaires.
Nevertheless, although ours is the first study of its kind on any industry, we hope that our work
will open up a research agenda that examines such variation across industries.34
In addition, as with all descriptive work, one limitation of this research is that we cannot
definitively establish the causal dynamics of the relationships we demonstrated. Although the
underlying political behavior theories we drew from have been carefully tested elsewhere (e.g.,
Tesler 2015), we would welcome future research that more firmly establishes the causal
relationships and mechanisms underpinning the relationships we demonstrated.
We should also stress that our argument is not that the predispositions common in an
economic elite’s industry are all that matters for their politics. Future work can and should
explore how economic elites navigate conflicts between their industry’s interests and their own
predispositions. What we have established is that analyses of the interplay between economic
inequality and political power should pay greater attention to the predispositions held by the
particular group of economically elite individuals whose wealth and political power are growing.
References
Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel and John Zaller. 2012. “A
34The individuals in each industry who opt into donating to each party are also not random, meaning it is unclear
what variation we would expect by occupation within our donor survey. Our mass public sample, like most, also has
too few wealthy individuals to provide meaningful data.
38
Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics.”
Perspectives on Politics 10(3):571–597.
Berinsky, Adam J. 2017. “Measuring Public Opinion with Surveys.” Annual Review of Political
Science 20:309–329.
Bonica, Adam and Howard Rosenthal. 2015. “The Wealth Elasticity of Political Contributions by
the Forbes 400.” Working Paper, Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2668780.
Dahl, Robert A. 1961. Who Governs? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Enns, Peter K. 2015. “Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation.” Perspectives on
Politics 13(4):1053–1064.
Feddersen, Timothy, Sean Gailmard and Alvaro Sandroni. 2009. “Moral Bias in Large Elections:
Theory and Experimental Evidence.” American Political Science Review 103(2):175–192.
Feldman, Stanley and Karen Stenner. 1997. “Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism.” Political
Psychology 18(4):741–770.
Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling and Shang E. Ha.
2010. “Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships Across Issue Domains and Political
Contexts.” American Political Science Review 104(1):111–133.
Gilens, Martin. 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gilens, Martin and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12(3):564–581.
Hacker, Jacob S and Paul Pierson. 2017. American Amnesia. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander. 2018. Politics at Work. New York: Oxford University Press.
39
Hetherington, Marc J. and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. Authoritarianism and Polarization in
American Politics. New York: Cambridge.
Jackman, Simon and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. Cosmopolitanism. In Facing the Challenge of
Democracy: Explorations in the Analysis of Public Opinion and Political Participation, ed.
Paul M. Sniderman and Benjamin Highton. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Lawless, Jennifer L. and Richard Logan Fox. 2015. Running from Office: Why Young Americans
are Turned Off to Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lax, Jeffrey R., Justin Phillips and Adam Zelizer. 2017. “The Party or the Purse? Unequal
Representation in the U.S. Senate.” Working paper, available at https://adamzelizer.
files.wordpress.com/2016/06/party-or-the-purse.pdf.
Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books.
Markoff, John. 2005. What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counterculture Shaped the
Personal Computer Industry. New York: Penguin.
Page, Benjamin I., Larry M. Bartels and Jason Seawright. 2013. “Democracy and the Policy
Preferences of Wealthy Americans.” Perspectives on Politics 11(1):51–73.
Schickler, Eric. 2016. Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-
1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sears, David O. and Carolyn L. Funk. 1999. “Evidence of the Long-Term Persistence of Adults’
Political Predispositions.” Journal of Politics 61(1):1–28.
40
Shiller, Robert J., Maxim Boycko and Vladimir Korobov. 1990. “Popular Attitudes towards Free
Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared.” NBER Working Paper, Available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w3453.
Stenner, Karen. 2005. The Authoritarian Dynamic. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tesler, Michael. 2012. “The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama
Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race.” American Journal of Political Science
56(3):690–704.
Tesler, Michael. 2015. “Priming Predispositions and Changing Policy Positions: An Account of
When Mass Opinion is Primed or Changed.” American Journal of Political Science 59(4):806–
824.
41
